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CAN THE RETAIL INVESTOR SURVIVE THE 
FIDUCIARY STANDARD? 
PAUL R. WALSH† AND DAVID W. JOHNS‡ 
For the retail investor in the United States, generally two 
options are available for seeking professional investment advice 
to reach their financial goals: hiring a broker-dealer or an 
investment adviser.  Each entity is governed under separate 
regulatory schemes.  With the recent financial collapse and the 
ensuing jump to regulation, there is a push to make a uniform 
standard for all investment recommendations—a fiduciary 
standard—that would be a one-size-fits-all reaction, leading to 
less access and higher costs for the smaller investor.1  Continued 
regulation of more disclosure and transparency in the investment 
sales process, stronger requirements of the investment sales 
person, proliferation of common sense education of the investing 
public in handling their own money, and swifter punishment 
under existing rules of bad actors should be the regulatory focus.   
I. REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT OF BROKER-DEALER AND 
INVESTMENT ADVISORS 
Regulation of broker-dealers is primarily under the purview 
of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission’s (“SEC”) 
antifraud authority within the Securities Act of 1933 (“Securities 
 
† Paul R. Walsh is a 1992 graduate of St. John’s University School of Law. He is 
a Senior Vice President and Director of Compliance for a dually registered U.S. 
investment adviser and broker-dealer. Paul is also an Adjunct Professor of Law at 
St. John’s University School of Law where he teaches Broker-Dealer Regulation. 
‡ David W. Johns attended Stetson University College of Law, obtaining his 
M.B.A. and J.D. in 2011. He is an Assistant Vice President and Compliance 
Specialist at a large financial services firm and has extensive experience with 
various regulatory agencies, responding to inquiries and investigations by the SEC, 
FINRA, and state agencies.  
1 See Michael Finke & Thomas P. Langdon, The Impact of the Broker-Dealer 
Fiduciary Standard on Financial Advice, 25 J. FIN. PLAN. 28, 33 (2012) (imposing a 
uniform fiduciary standard on both investment advisors and broker-dealers does not 
account for individual client characteristics and business models, and will result in 
adverse consequences). 
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Act”), the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”), 
Exchange Act rules and Self-Regulatory Organization (“SRO”) 
rules.  A broker-dealer’s obligations to its customers flow from 
the SEC, and the rules, case law, disciplinary actions, and 
enforcement actions promulgated by its primary SRO, the 
Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”).  FINRA’s 
primary responsibility is to protect investors from abusive 
practices caused by the conflicting financial interests between 
broker-dealers and their client, and the rules impose suitability 
obligations on broker’s recommendations.2   
Conversely, regulation of investment advisers falls under the 
Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (“Advisers Act”), which imposes 
a fiduciary duty on the adviser to act in its client’s best interests.3  
Arguably, the key difference in regulation is the regulatory 
approach: rule-based versus principle-based.   
A. Broker-Dealer Regulation: Rule-Based Regulation 
Broker-dealer regulation has generally been described as the 
duty to deal fairly with customers, adhere to high standards of 
commercial honor and fair and equitable trade principles, and 
respect specific obligations, including ensuring investment 
suitability and disclosing certain conflicts of interest.4  The 
primary legislation for broker-dealer regulation is the Exchange 
Act.  Under the Exchange Act, a broker is defined as “any person 
engaged in the business of effecting transactions in securities for 
the account of others,” whereas a dealer is defined as “any person 
engaged in the business of buying and selling securities . . . for 
such person’s own account through a broker or otherwise.”5  The 
Exchange Act provides for detailed regulation of the conduct of 
broker-dealers, including investor protection provisions in the 
form of antifraud controls that prohibit both the 
misrepresentation or omission of material facts and fraudulent or 
manipulative practices in connection with the purchase or sale of 
securities.6   
 
2 See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N STAFF, STUDY ON INVESTMENT ADVISERS AND 
BROKER-DEALERS iv (2011) [hereinafter SEC STUDY], available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2011/913studyfinal.pdf (noting that broker-dealers 
are obligated, by statutory provisions, to deal fairly with clients). 
3 Id. at 21–22. 
4 Id. at 106. 
5 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4)(A)–(5)(A) (2006). 
6 SEC STUDY, supra note 2, at 53. 
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Shortly after it passed the Exchange Act, Congress passed 
the Maloney Act Amendments, which established a system of 
self-regulation for broker-dealers and resulted in what is now 
FINRA.7  The Maloney Act created and empowered a variety of 
SROs, including national securities exchanges and the NASD—
now known as FINRA—to have extensive oversight over 
securities broker-dealers and other market players.8  Thus, while 
the Exchange Act rules are more focused on fraud prevention and 
are the backdrop for broker-dealer obligations, FINRA rules, 
among others, address unethical behavior that may not rise to 
the level of fraud.   
B. Investment Advisers Act: Principle-Based Regulation 
In 1935, the SEC commissioned a study of investment trusts 
and investment companies.9  A product of the study, the 
Investment Counsel Report (“Counsel Report”), revealed that the 
number and amount of assets investment advisers managed was 
ambiguous.10  The Counsel Report identified two major problems: 
(1) harm to the public inflicted by dishonest advisers; and 
(2) reputational harm to legitimate investment advisers.11  In 
response to these problems, Congress passed the Investment 
Advisers Act of 1940,12 subjecting investment advisers to 
statutory fiduciary standards.13  While some provisions and rules 
impose specific prohibitions or requirements, the fiduciary duty 
is the main governor of the adviser-client relationship.14  While 
the term “fiduciary” is not found in the Advisers Act, the Act 
prohibits investment advisers from engaging in fraudulent or  
 
 
7 See Maloney Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-719, 52 Stat. 1070 (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3 (2006)) (providing guidelines for registering as a 
national securities association with the SEC). 
8 Saule T. Omarova, Rethinking the Future of Self-Regulation in the Financial 
Industry, 35 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 665, 693 (2010). 
9 See H.R. DOC. NO. 76-477 (1939). 
10 See id. at 2, 8. 
11 See S. REP. NO. 76-1755, at 21 (1940). 
12 Investment Advisors Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-768, 54 Stat. 789 (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 80b-1 to -21 (2006)). 
13 See id. § 206(3), 54 Stat. at 852 (codified as amended at § 80b-6). 
14 See SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 191, 194 
(1963) (interpreting the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 as Congressional 
recognition of the fiduciary relationship between investment advisers and their 
clients). 
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deceptive transactions and imposes on them a duty to make 
disclosures to their clients even when there is no intent to 
defraud.15   
Congress defined an “investment adviser” as “any person 
who, for compensation, engages in the business of advising 
others, either directly or through publications or writings, as to 
the value of securities or as to the advisability of investing in, 
purchasing, or selling securities.”16  As a consequence of such a 
broad definition, broker-dealers fell within its purview and were 
subject to its reach.17  Thus, the broker-dealer exclusion was 
born.  Because broker-dealers were regulated by the Exchange 
Act, Congress excluded broker-dealers from the Advisers Act if 
two conditions were met: (1) the broker’s advice was “solely 
incidental” to brokerage services; and (2) the broker did not 
receive any “special compensation” for the advice.18  The term 
“solely incidental” was not defined, but legislative history 
specifies that the exclusion will apply only if the compensation 
received by the broker-dealer is strictly commission-based.19   
C. Standards of Conduct 
Brokers must meet a suitability standard when providing 
information regarding financial products.  “Suitability” means 
that there is a reasonable basis for investment recommendations 
with regard to a customer’s financial situation.20  The suitability 
standard does not require a broker to recommend the best 
possible product for the situation, nor does it require the broker 
to notify the client that another broker could perform the 
transaction for less commission; rather, it requires the broker to 
find the “best execution” for the product.21   
 
 
15 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (2006) (effective July 22, 2010). 
16 Id. § 80b-2(a)(11). 
17 Arthur B. Laby, Reforming the Regulation of Broker-Dealers and Investment 
Advisers, 65 BUS. LAW. 395, 403 (2010). 
18 SEC STUDY, supra note 2, at 15–16; 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11)(C).  
19 See S. REP. NO. 76-1755, at 22 (1940); Laby, supra note 17, at 403. 
20  SEC STUDY, supra note 2, at 52 n.226. 
21 See id. at 69 (explaining that broker-dealers are legally obligated to obtain 
the most favorable terms reasonably available in executing a customer’s trades). But 
cf. id. at 54 (stating that “courts have found broker-dealers to have a fiduciary duty 
under certain circumstances”). 
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The suitability standard is codified in the recently enacted 
FINRA Rule 2111 and uses a broker’s “recommendation” to a 
customer as the “triggering event” for its application.22  What 
constitutes a “recommendation” is determined by the facts and 
circumstances surrounding the transaction.23  Under FINRA 
Rule 2111, investment strategies involving securities, regardless 
of whether the recommendation results in a transaction, must be 
suitable even if the recommended strategy is to hold a particular 
investment and do nothing.24  Rule 2111 explicitly sets forth the 
information that a broker-dealer must attempt to obtain and 
review in order to perform a sufficient suitability analysis.  This 
information includes the client’s age, investment experience, time 
horizon, liquidity needs, risk tolerance, tax status, financial 
situation and needs, investment objectives, and other holdings.25  
A broker-dealer, through its associated persons, must document 
with specificity its basis for believing that a particular factor is 
not relevant in determining suitability for a particular client in 
order to be exempt from gathering that information.26   
Rule 2111 consists of three main obligations: reasonable 
basis suitability, customer-specific suitability, and quantitative 
suitability.27  Reasonable basis suitability requires that a broker’s 
recommendation is suitable for at least some investors based 
upon the potential risks and rewards associated with 
recommending that security.28  Customer-specific suitability 
requires that the broker’s recommendation is suitable for a 
particular investor based upon that investor’s investment 
profile.29  Quantitative suitability requires that a broker with 
actual or de facto control over a customer’s account have a 
reasonable basis for a series of recommendations and prohibits 
the broker from making excessive and unsuitable transactions 
for the customer.30  When determining quantitative suitability, 
 
22 FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH., REGULATORY NOTICE 11-02, KNOW YOUR 
CUSTOMER AND SUITABILITY 2 (2011), available at http://www.finra.org/web/groups/ 
industry/@ip/@reg/@notice/documents/notices/p122778.pdf. 
23 Id. 
24 Id. at 3. 
25 Id. at 2. 
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the transactions must be viewed as a whole considering the 
customer’s investment profile.31  In sum, Rule 2111 requires that 
a broker fully understand both the recommended product and the 
customer; a lack of either understanding is a suitability 
violation.32   
II. THE GAME-CHANGERS 
A. The Blurring of the Broker-Dealer/Investment Advisor Line 
In the 1990s, some brokerage firms started offering fee-
based, as opposed to commission-based, compensation.33  
Increased competition between broker-dealers resulted in the 
prioritization of revenue stabilization and the movement to fee-
based brokerage services.34  At the same time, the SEC 
commissioned a committee to review the conflicts of interest in 
the brokerage industry and the recommended “best practices” for 
a compensation structure for registered representatives of 
broker-dealers.35  It recommended that a portion of a registered 
representative’s compensation be based upon the assets held in 
the account regardless of whether any transactions occur, 
resulting in a continued “revenue stream” for the broker and 
reducing the risk of “churning” in the account.36  As fee-based 
brokerage services grew, the distinction between investment 
advisors and broker-dealers became ambiguous.  Each now had 
analogous functions and similar compensation schemes, which 
could be considered “special compensation” under the Advisers 
Act because the schemes were not commission-based.37  Broker-




33 COMM. ON COMP. PRACTICES, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON COMPENSATION 
PRACTICES 3 (1995), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/bkrcomp.txt 
[hereinafter REPORT ON COMPENSATION PRACTICES]. 
34 See Leslie Wayne, The Discounters Storm Wall Street, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 26, 
1982, at 3 (explaining how full-service firms are competing with discount firms by 
offering products not offered by discount firms, and on a fee for service basis). 
35 REPORT ON COMPENSATION PRACTICES, supra note 33, at 4–5. 
36 Id. at 10; Laby, supra note 17, at 406. 
37 See Certain Broker-Dealers Deemed Not To Be Investment Advisers, 
Exchange Act Release No. 34-51,523, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 2376, 70 
Fed. Reg. 20,424, 20,425 (Apr. 12, 2005) [hereinafter Release No. 51,523] (defining 
“special compensation” as involving “the receipt by a broker-dealer of compensation 
other than brokerage commissions or dealer compensation); see also Certain Broker- 
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Application of the Advisers Act to fee-based accounts 
presented numerous new regulations, in addition to the 
regulatory scheme already in place for broker-dealers.  Of 
primary concern was section 206(3) of the Advisers Act, which 
bars certain transactions, unless written disclosure is provided to 
the client and consent is given prior to each transaction.38  This 
requirement, because of the active nature of the markets, would 
effectively ban a broker’s ability to effect principal trades for its 
account.39  In response, the SEC enacted Rule 202(a)(11)-1 under 
the Advisers Act, which prevents the application of the Act to 
broker-dealers due to a fee-based structure if three conditions 
were met: (1) the advice provided was not discretionary; (2) the 
advice was solely incidental to brokerage services; and (3) the 
broker-dealer informed the customer that their account was a 
brokerage account.40  The rule did not sit well with investment 
advisers because, in their view, it circumvented the fiduciary 
duty and disclosure protections given to clients under the 
Advisers Act and fostered competition with broker-dealers who 
were not required to adhere to equivalent regulatory 
responsibilities.41  This culminated in the 2007 decision by the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Washington, D.C. Circuit in 




Dealers Deemed Not To Be Investment Advisors, Exchange Act Release No. 42,099, 
Investment Advisors Act Release No. 1845, 64 Fed. Reg. 61,226, 61,228 (Nov. 4, 
1999) (receiving compensation other than traditional brokerage commission may 
constitute “special compensation”). 
38 Investment Advisers Act of 1940 § 206(3), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6(3) (2006); see 
Opinion of Director of Trading and Exchange, Relating to Section 206 of the 
Investment Advisors Act of 1940, Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, and 
Sections 10(b) and 15(c) (1) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Investment 
Advisers Act Release No. 8, 11 Fed. Reg. 10,997 (Feb. 5, 1945) (noting that an 
investment advisor is a fiduciary, and therefore, must act in the client’s best 
interests and obtain consent before effecting a transaction). 
39 See Laby, supra note 17, at 408 (explaining that the speed of electronic 
trading inhibits advisors ability to effect such transactions because they do not have 
time to comply with the requirements of section 206(3)). 
40 Id. at 409. 
41 SEC Release No. 51,523, supra note 37, at 11. 
42 482 F.3d 481 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
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1. Financial Planning Association v. SEC 
Rule 202(a) (11)-1 did not have a long existence.  It was 
overruled, which revived the question of whether broker-dealers 
were subject to the Advisers Act for fee-based accounts.43  The 
primary argument of the Financial Planning Association (“FPA”) 
was that the SEC lacked the statutory authority to implement 
the rule.44  Conversely, the SEC argued that Section 
202(a)(11)(F), which provides the SEC with the power to exclude 
“such other persons not within the intent of this paragraph, as 
the [SEC] may designate,” gave it the authority to exclude 
certain brokers from the Advisers Act that do receive special 
compensation because the investment advice provided was the 
same as that provided by brokers already excluded from the 
Act.45  Specifically, the argument was that the advice was 
incidental to the brokerage services provided.46  However, the 
Court found the rule at odds with the Advisers Act, and thus, 
struck it down.47   
Because of the massive amount of assets accrued in fee-
based brokerage accounts at the time of the Court’s decision, the 
SEC obtained a stay until October 1, 2007.48  The SEC ultimately 
decided that by the expiration of the stay, customers had to 
decide to either “convert their fee-based brokerage accounts to 
advisory accounts or to traditional commission-based brokerage 
accounts.”49  Therefore, the issue of whether a broker’s 
investment advice is the same as an investment adviser’s advice 
remained unsettled.  That is, until the financial crisis of 2008, 
when these issues became the forefront of discussion yet again.   
 
43 See id. at 493 (vacating the Broker-Dealer Rule). 
44 See id. at 487 (contending that the SEC exceeded its statutory authority by 
excepting from IAA coverage a group of broker-dealers Congress did not identify and 
intend to except in subsection (C)). 
45 Id. at 488. 
46 See id. at 487–88 (referring to Section 202(a)(1)(C) that excepts from IAA 
coverage brokers or dealers whose investment advisory services are “solely 
incidental” to their regular business and who do not receive additional commission 
for such services). 
47 Id. at 488. 
48 Fin. Planning Ass’n v. SEC, No. 04-1242, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 15169 (D.C. 
Cir. June 25, 2007). 
49 Temporary Rule Regarding Principal Trades with Certain Advisory Clients, 
Investment Advisers Act Release No. 2653, 72 Fed. Reg. 55,022, 55,024 (Sept. 24, 
2007). 
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2. The Dodd-Frank Act 
After much debate in the legislative branches, Congress 
enacted the Dodd-Frank Wall Street and Consumer Protection 
Act of 2010 (“Dodd-Frank”) to address the triggers of the 2008 
financial crisis.  Section 913 of the Dodd-Frank Act mandated the 
SEC to perform a study to examine broker-dealer and investment 
adviser duties to their clients prior to any rulemaking.50  
Specifically, the SEC was to evaluate, among other things, the 
following: (1) the effectiveness of the existing legal or regulatory 
standards of care for personalized investment advice and 
recommendations to retail customers; and (2) the existence of 
regulatory gaps, shortcomings, or overlaps in regard to the 
protection of retail customers that should be addressed.51  
Moreover, section 913 explicitly gives the SEC the authority to 
require broker-dealers and investment advisers to adhere to a 
universal fiduciary duty when providing personalized securities-
related investment advice to retail customers.52  The SEC study 
was released in January 2011, and among other findings, found 
that investors are often confused by differing standards of care 
that apply to investment advisers and broker-dealers.53  
Consequently, the major recommendation made by the SEC was 
to merge the standards of care for broker-dealers and investment 
advisors into a universal standard.54  In other words, when 
personalized investment advice is given to retail customers, the 
best interest of the customer takes priority without regard to the 
financial interest or other interest of the broker, dealer, or 
investment adviser giving the advice.   
B. No One Can Serve Two Masters 
The Biblical admonition that a person cannot serve two 
masters is at the heart of the problem in applying a fiduciary 
standard to a broker-dealers transaction-based commission 
business.  By its very nature as a for-profit entity, a broker-
dealer will inherently act in its own financial interest by dealing 
for its own account and by striving to maximize its profits.  
 
50 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 
No. 111-203, § 913, 124 Stat. 1376, 1826 (2010). 
51 Id. § 913(b)(1)–(2). 
52 Id. § 913(g). 
53 SEC STUDY, supra note 2, at i. 
54 Id. at v–vi. 
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Consequently, there is an inherent fatal flaw in the SEC’s 
recommendation to apply a universal fiduciary standard.  The 
universal fiduciary duty standard, as put forth by the SEC study, 
consists of two parts: the duty of loyalty and the duty of care.55  
The duty of loyalty is the primary tenet of a fiduciary standard, 
and violating it negates the very meaning of what it means to be 
a fiduciary.56  Under the duty of loyalty, the broker or adviser is 
prohibited from placing their interest ahead of the interests of 
the customer and is required to disclose any conflicts of interest.57  
Under the duty of care, a broker or adviser is held to minimum 
standards of review and analysis when making investment 
recommendations or otherwise providing personalized 
investment advice to retail customers.58  In other words, a 
broker-dealer that owes a duty of loyalty to its shareholders to 
make a profit would be violating the duty of loyalty it owes to it 
customers.  Should a broker-dealer that makes a 
recommendation to a customer of a non-discretionary account 
somehow “ensure” that its recommendation is solely in the best 
interest of the customer and at least on par or better than the 
broker-dealer’s best interest?  Shouldn’t the recommendation be 
suitable for the customer and then left to the customer to make 
the final call? 
C. The Small Investor Loses Out 
A fiduciary duty is an ongoing obligation between the party 
that owes the duty of loyalty and care to the person relying on 
that duty.59  Investment advisers are compensated generally by a 
percentage-fee charged against their client’s assets under 




55 Id. at vi. 
56 Cheryl Goss Weiss, A Review of the Historic Foundations of Broker-Dealer 
Liability for Breach of Fiduciary Duty, 23 J. CORP. L. 65, 68 & n.5 (1997). 
57 SEC STUDY, supra note 2, at 112. 
58 Id. at 123. 
59 Weiss, supra note 56, at 68. 
60 See Christopher Condon, The Rise of the Registered Investment Adviser, 
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Mar. 3, 2011), http://www.businessweek.com/ 
magazine/content/11_11/b4219041484091.htm (noting that most advisors do not 
depend on commission and instead, typically charge a fixed annual percentage of the 
client’s money). 
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fiduciary duty.  The investment adviser makes more money as 
his client’s assets increase; thus, the duties and their 
pocketbooks are aligned.   
For brokers who are paid commissions based upon individual 
investment transaction recommendations, the suitability 
standard is also consistent with their duties and pocketbooks.  A 
broker gets paid for a suitable recommendation made at that 
time.  To impose a fiduciary duty would extend a broker’s duty 
beyond a single transaction recommendation.  Now the broker 
would have to provide on-going monitoring of client’s accounts, 
looking always to ensure the client’s financial accounts are 
working in the client’s best interest.  A commission based 
compensation scheme cannot support adherence to a fiduciary 
duty imposed on a broker dealer.  Thus, broker-dealers would 
most likely move to a percentage fee charged against assets 
under management model to support the enhanced requirements 
of the fiduciary duty.  In order to make money, broker-dealers 
will require minimum assets for them to manage, just like 
investment advisers require.  The small investor will not have 
the assets needed to get professional recommendations and 
advice until they are able to grow their own accounts perhaps 
through the use of online brokerage firms.  Only individuals with 
sizable assets will be able to obtain the assistance of a broker or 
investment adviser.   
D. Caveat Emptor 
The recommendation of a fiduciary duty for a registered 
representative of a broker-dealer emphatically ignores the 
relationship between a registered representative and a client.  
Caveat emptor, the Latin phrase for “let the buyer beware,” 
proclaims that the buyer must perform her own due diligence 
when purchasing an item or service.  Brokers, dealers, and 
advisors commonly lack authority to perform transactions or 
commit a customer’s property without prior customer approval, 
and most clients of a registered representative do not wish to 
grant this power; in other words, the broker cannot exercise 
discretion.61  In short, a broker is a salesperson.  Accordingly, 
imposition of a fiduciary duty on a salesperson conflicts with the 
 
61 See Weiss, supra note 56, at 76 (requiring that the broker execute the 
customer’s order “in exact conformity to the customer’s instructions”). 
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purpose of the sales profession—to make money.62  Why does it 
appear that lawmakers and regulators alike want to credit 
broker dealer salespersons with knowledge beyond the minimum 
requirements enacted to become an investment salesperson?  If 
the belief in our culture is that someone who calls themselves a 
“financial adviser” or “financial representative” is credited with 
expertise beyond required training, then educational 
requirements for entry into the financial investing world should 
be raised by regulation.   
A broker’s livelihood is based upon the amount of 
commissions earned with each sale.  Like with any non-financial 
salesperson, most consumers automatically go on the defensive 
because they know the goal of the salesperson is to make the 
sale.  Instinctively, the general public is skeptical of a 
salesperson’s “puffery,” has a desire to shop around with other 
vendors, and seeks out additional advice before making a 
purchase.63  Protecting people from themselves is a deadweight 
that kills growth, entrepreneurialism, opportunities, including 
job opportunities, and investor returns.64  It adds nothing to the 
wealth of society and, indeed, prevents the functioning of a 
healthy economy.65  Morgan Clemons in his paper, 
Harmonization v. Demarcation: The Problems with a Broker 
Fiduciary Duty and the Benefits of the Merrill Rule, clearly 
articulates the innate defense mechanism within the general 
public regarding sales persons.  He states:   
While there are so-called “lemon laws” for cars, implied 
warranties for various products, etc., arguably these are duties 
of care and not duties of loyalty; no one expects that a car 
salesman will sell the car that is in the customer’s budget 
necessarily but rather the car that may yield him the higher 
commission from that particular sale.66   
 
62 Morgan Clemons, Harmonization v. Demarcation: The Problems with a 
Broker Fiduciary Duty and the Benefits of the Merrill Rule 27 (Oct. 28, 2010) 
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=1699274. 
63 Id. 
64 See id. at 27–29 (analogizing brokers to salesmen and stating that if salesmen 
had to propose the best car for the individual, they would charge more to cover the 
cost of the training that would help ensure that the advice given is accurate and 
would be inclined to sell a narrow class of American-made cars, causing customers to 
resort to markets overseas). 
65 See id. 
66 Id. at 27–28. 
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The investing public must change their views of investment 
salespersons to be more in line with the views the general public 
exhibits for the car salesman.  An effort should be made through 
the American educational system, regulatory notices, and public 
service messages to heighten the public’s knowledge of the 
interests of broker-dealers as salespersons.  Broker-dealers 
should be required to provide plain English language disclosures 
agreed upon by regulators disclosing the conflicts.  Customers 
should shop around, meet different brokers, and get 
recommendations from family and friends before selecting 
someone who will provide recommendations.  Regulators should 
not be so hesitant to punish salespersons for unsuitable 
recommendations, and the marketplace should put out of 
business those brokers whose recommendations consistently lose 
their client’s money.   
CONCLUSION 
The imposition of a fiduciary duty onto the broker or 
salesman will create a barrier to the availability of investment 
advice to the small investor.  If the investor can afford an 
investment advisor, that relationship will be governed by the 
fiduciary standard of care and the costs associated with it.  If the 
investor can only afford transaction-by-transaction 
recommendations, that option should not be eliminated.  Instead 
of regulations that would result in fewer investment options for 
the small investor, the focus of regulators should be on informing 
and educating the public, and aggressively pursuing brokers and 
investment advisers who violate existing rules and obligations.  
Concurrently, investors are encouraged to take a stronger 
interest in the qualifications, reputations and success of the 
individuals they seek to compensate for investment 
recommendations.  Brokers are part of a transaction based 
compensation system where the product is central and their 
advice is incidental.  The inverse is found in the investment 
adviser-client relationship; the product is incidental to the 
advice.  Therein lies the dilemma:  How could a fiduciary 
standard, which would require disinterested investment advice, 
be reconciled with a compensation structure linked to the 
product?  It would not be reconciled; the average investor will 
lose access to transactional investment brokers, and access to 
professional investment advice would be limited to the wealthy. 
